Maison de la recherche, 75006 Paris
Présentation générale :
Consciousness is subjective : only the subject having the conscious experience has direct (or non-inferential) knowledge about it. Subjects enjoy a kind of access to their conscious episodes that scientists cannot have, when trying to investigate the neural basis of consciousness. This subjective aspect of conscious experience is what makes its scientific study so challenging. Understanding the distinctive kind of knowledge provided by introspection, and its functional and neural underpinnings therefore appears as a necessary step towards the assessment and integration of first-person data in the scientific study of consciousness.
In the course of this seminar, we wish to examine the recent contributions of cognitive sciences to the study of introspection, and the prospects they open in understanding the fine and complex interplay between consciousness, attention and metacognition.
23 février 2017
Discussion de Roessler, J. (1999) "Perception, Introspection and Attention", European Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), pp. 47-64.
2 mars 2017
Discussion de Thompson, B. (2009), "Senses for senses", Australasion Journal of Philosophy, 87, pp.99-117.
9 mars 2017
16 mars 2017
Anna Giustina (IJN)
23 mars 2017
30 mars 2017
Andrew Lee (NYU, IJN)
20 avril 2017
Olof Soderlind (Paris 1, IHPST) - Knowing How to Avoid Zombies
27 avril 2017
4 mai 2017
Emile Thalabard (SND) - Some remarks on generic phenomenology